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Rome and Imperialism
Rome in the history of 
imperialism
Rome has long occupied a central place in 
the theorisation of empire. One reason is that 
imperial symbols and language – eagles, fas-
ces, laurel wreaths, and the Latin titulature of 
empire – have been repeatedly appropriated 
in the Western tradition by expanding powers 
and states. The Frankish King Charlemagne 
had himself crowned emperor by the Pope 
in Rome in 800. The title Kaisar (Caesar) was 
used by the rulers of successive German 
emperors in the Middle Ages, and Czar by 
various Eastern European powers up to and 
including the rulers of Russia. Medieval 
appropriations related as much to the contem-
porary presence of the emperors of Byzantium 
(who continued to be Caesars and to rule a 
Roman Empire into the 15th century) as to any 
close connection with earlier periods. But the 
increased interest in the classical past across 
Europe from the early modern period meant 
that Rome was repeatedly a mode. After the 
French Revolution and Napoleon’s abolition 
of the Holy Roman (German) Empire, Roman 
titulature was adopted by French, Austrian, 
and British rulers. Many titles and symbols of 
Roman origin remained current until the mid-
dle of the 20th century.
That reception history has been a mixed 
blessing for the study of ancient Rome 
(Harrison 2008). While it has meant that Rome 
has received much closer attention than many 
other early empires – such as Achaemenid 
Persia, the Hellenistic kingdoms of the 
Abbasid Caliphate – the repeated comparisons 
have introduced many anachronisms. Among 
these have been debates over the economic 
motors and costs of Roman imperialism, 
and over its civilising or brutalising effects. 
To some extent this remains the case in con-
temporary comparisons between Rome and 
America and even with post-colonial interpre-
tations of ancient Rome, which sometimes 
seem tinged with post-colonial guilt. The best 
comparisons have in fact repeatedly drawn out 
contrasts between ancient Roman and mod-
ern European imperialism, and exposed the 
ideological component of claims to the con-
trary (Brunt 1965; Malamud 2009). It has even 
been suggested that we should not employ 
the term ‘imperialism’ to describe Roman 
expansion, so as to avoid importing con-
notations of competing hegemonies led by 
modernising nation states (Veyne 1975): 
those who follow Lenin’s notion of impe-
rialism as a distinct stage of capitalism 
(1934) would also have to reject the label as 
it applied to Rome.
In practice it is not feasible to dispense with 
the labels ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’, as simi-
lar problems face any alternative terminol-
ogy. The most thoughtful recent approaches 
treat Rome as one of number of similar 
political entities often termed early empires. 
Depending on the focus of the analysis 
these are often qualified as tributary empires 
(in relation to their political economy) or 
pre-capitalist or pre-industrial if their eco-
nomic life or technology seems more impor-
tant. Broadly similar to Rome would be the 
sequence of Chinese empires that began in 
221 BCE with the creation of the Qin dynasty, 
a series of empires based on the Iranian pla-
teau including those of the Achaemenid, 
Parthian, and Sassanian dynasties, prob-
ably the Neo-Assyrian Empire that controlled 
Mesopotamia and surrounding states in the 
first half of the last millennium BCE, a series 
of empires based on the Indo-Gangetic plain 
beginning with the Maurya dynasty of 322–
185 BCE, the larger Macedonian-ruled king-
doms that divided the territory of the former 
Achaemenid Empire in roughly the same 
period, and a series of much later New World 
empires including those of the Aztec and 
the Inka. Each of these represented a system 
of political domination created by one peo-
ple through the conquest and intimidation 
of a number of other peoples and often by 
the absorption of a number of earlier states. 
Typically they were sustained by exactions of 
labour (military and other), of agricultural 
produce, and of metals, and typically much 
of this was spent on rewarding various privi-
leged populations or classes and supporting 
military forces. Most of these entities invested 
in infrastructure – roads, canals, fortifica-
tions, storehouses, and ports – and in cer-
emonial and monuments. Almost all were 
ruled by autocrats. Most (with the exception 
of the New World examples) had iron metal-
lurgy; most used writing and had imperial 
systems of weights and measures. None had 
any source of energy beyond human and ani-
mal labour, and none had any system of com-
munications faster than a sailing vessel or a 
relay of riders or runners could provide. 
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2 Rome and Imperialism
There is disagreement on the most appro-
priate boundaries of this analytical category. 
Some scholars would include some of the 
earlier and generally smaller expansionist 
states of the Bronze Age Near East, includ-
ing New Kingdom Egypt, and analogous 
states in Central and South America like that 
of Wari, and some would include the short-
lived hegemonies exercised by powerful city 
states over their neighbours in city state civi-
lisations (see Hansen 2000, 2002). Whether 
medieval and early modern empires were 
essentially similar is also debated. A num-
ber of recent synoptic studies deal with these 
questions (Alcock et al. 2001; Bang and Bayly 
2003, 2011; Morris and Scheidel 2009). Some 
of these draw on historical sociologies of 
empire (Doyle 1986; Eisenstadt 1963; Hardt 
and Negri 2000; Kautsky 1982). Despite these 
disagreements over the proper limits of com-
parison, consideration of at least some other 
early empires provides a useful perspective on 
Roman imperialism. In particular, compara-
tive analysis often reveals what was unique 
or unusual in the solutions Romans adopted 
to problems that were widely faced by early 
imperial powers, such as peripheral revolts, 
the integration of minorities, or the formida-
ble limitations on long-distance communica-
tions before the industrial revolution.
The phases of Roman 
expansion
The full story of the growth, stabilisation, 
and collapse of Roman political domina-
tion can only be sketched out here (see 
Champion 2004; Nicolet 1977; Woolf 2012). 
Roman tradition dated the foundation of the 
city to the middle of the eighth century BCE, 
and archaeological research suggests that 
the site of Rome was at least occupied by that 
point. The institutions of a city state emerged 
around the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, 
probably a little later than in Etruria (Tuscany) 
just to the north or in the areas to the south 
where Greek cities were created. During the 
first half of the last millennium BCE, urban 
settlements and archaic states were created 
all around the Mediterranean and Black Seas. 
By the fifth century BCE some larger states – 
Athens, Sparta, Syracuse, and Carthage are 
the most famous – were coming to dominate 
their neighbours. Rome was not in quite the 
same league as these powers, but was prob-
ably already expanding at the expense of its 
immediate neighbours. During the fourth 
century BCE Rome first defeated the larg-
est of the cities of southern Etruria, Veii, 
and then extended its control over its Latin-
speaking neighbours and the hill tribes of 
central Italy. Wars fought almost every year, 
supported by contingents from its defeated 
‘allies’, extended a hegemony over most of 
Italy south of the Apennines, although this 
was not expressed in regular extraction of 
tribute, and most of the cities and people 
of the peninsula remained autonomous even 
if they had lost effective control of their for-
eign relations. A demonstration of the resil-
ience of Roman control came in 280–275 BCE 
when Tarentum, one of the largest Greek cit-
ies of southern Italy, persuaded Pyrrhus, King 
of Epirus, to cross the Adriatic and challenge 
Rome. Although successful in several battles, 
Pyrrhus was unable to establish a power base, 
and his retreat in effect solidified Roman con-
trol of Italy. This was also the period in which 
Greek writers noticed the rise of Rome, and 
from this point on a more precise and accu-
rate kind of history can be written.
The Mediterranean world in the third and 
second centuries BCE was dominated by a 
small number of political hegemonies. In 
the east the Achaemenid Empire conquered 
by Alexander the Great had been divided 
between three large kingdoms – Seleukid 
Syria, Ptolemaic Egypt, and Antigonid 
Macedon – and a number of smaller states 
that aspired to the same status, among 
them the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and 
Pergamum in Asia Minor and that of Epirus in 
the Balkans. Between and around them were 
cities, leagues of cities, and tribal peoples like 
the Thracians, variously allies, suppliers of 
mercenaries, and victims of the wars between 
the Great Powers. Some cities, like Cyrene, 
Corinth, Athens, and Rhodes, were larger 
players than others. West of the Adriatic 
Rome had only one serious rival, the city of 
Carthage close to modern Tunis, which exer-
cised a loose control over other Phoenician 
foundations in north Africa, western Sicily 
and southern Spain. Sardinia and Corsica, 
the remainder of Mediterranean Spain, and 
most of southern France outside the small 
area controlled by the Greek city of Marseilles 
and her colonies were settled by tribal peo-
ples with little resembling cities or states. By 
the middle of the second century BCE Rome 
had established effective hegemony over the 
entirety of these regions.
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 Rome and Imperialism 3
A series of wars with Carthage (the Punic 
Wars) in 264–241 BCE, 218–201 BCE, and 
149–146 BCE gave Rome control of the west-
ern Mediterranean. The first Punic war was 
fought largely over Sicily and resulted in 
Rome becoming a naval power, as well as 
the creation of the first overseas provinces 
in Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. The second 
Punic war saw Hannibal cross the Alps but 
then be driven out of Italy, and Rome assert 
control over the entirety of Mediterranean 
Spain. Carthage was destroyed in 146 BCE 
and Rome established a foothold in north 
Africa; the Macedonian kingdom was 
defeated in 197 BCE and the Syrian king-
dom in 188 BCE. Rome did not immediately 
annex any territory east of the Adriatic, and 
to begin with seemed content to extract plun-
der, disrupt local hegemonies, and leave the 
region in the control of its allies. This proved 
unsustainable or at least unstable. Macedon 
was again defeated in 168 BCE and the king-
dom was abolished, to be replaced with four 
city states. Rome soon fell out with most of 
its east Mediterranean allies. The last king 
of Pergamum left his kingdom to Rome in 
his will, and so by the end of the second 
century Rome had provinces in the Balkans 
and western Asia Minor, had obliterated the 
ancient city of Corinth as an example of what 
happened to defiant allies, and seemed to 
contemporary observers like the Greek his-
torian Polybius to be the undisputed ruler of 
the civilised world. Rome had not, however, 
developed very efficient institutions of control 
and relied on public contractors to extract rev-
enue, basing no troops and very few officials 
in the east, and expecting both conquered 
territories and other powers (like Egypt) to 
accept orders from Roman envoys. When 
Mithradates, King of Pontus, invaded first the 
Roman province of Asia and then southern 
Greece he was able to exploit Rome’s unpop-
ularity, and Rome briefly lost control of all her 
possessions east of the Adriatic. That crisis 
coincided with a major rebellion by most of 
Rome’s Italian allies. The first half of the last 
century BCE was largely spent re-establishing 
Roman control (Morstein Kallet-Marx 1995).
The instruments through which the 
Roman Republic took its empire in hand 
included armies serving for long peri-
ods overseas, the beginnings of a tributary 
structure, and the concentration of power 
into the hands of a small number of gener-
als. Some of these were successful in using 
that power to extend Roman control well 
beyond the Mediterranean littoral. Between 
67 and 62 BCE Pompey first co-ordinated a 
Mediterranean-wide elimination of piracy 
and then campaigned throughout the Near 
East: his armies reached the Caspian and in 
Mesopotamia the boundaries of the Parthian 
(Persian) Empire. Between 58 and 52 BCE 
Julius Caesar took control of all non-Med-
iterranean France, campaigning up to and 
beyond the English Channel and the Rhine. 
Civil wars, drawing on the same resources 
as conquest, interrupted campaigns but 
also fuelled the competition for glory and 
booty and led to the acquisition of new terri-
tory, most notably Egypt in 30 BCE. Caesar’s 
great-nephew Augustus, the first emperor 
of Rome, masterminded campaigns that 
between 15 BCE and 9 CE extended Roman 
control to the Rhine and Danube. Other cam-
paigns took place in Armenia, Spain, Africa, 
and Arabia. On Augustus’s death in 14 CE 
the entire Mediterranean basin and much 
of its hinterlands were controlled either by 
provinces or through client kings. Some of 
those kingdoms were converted into prov-
inces in the course of the first century CE. 
Wars of conquest in Britain began in 43 CE, 
continuing sporadically but never taking per-
manent control of more than the lowlands of 
Scotland. The German frontier was advanced 
from the Rhine to the Neckar at the end of 
the first century AD, and most of modern 
Romania (Roman Dacia) was conquered soon 
after. 
The early second century CE marked the 
high-water mark of Roman power. A series of 
attempts to conquer Mesopotamia (modern 
Iraq) were made, and there were successful 
campaigns on several occasions through to 
the end of the fourth century, but a permanent 
presence was never established. From the last 
second century CE the empire came under 
more pressure. A 50-year period of chaos in 
the third century was marked by invasions, 
rebellions, a short-lived fragmentation, and 
an exceptionally rapid turnover of empires. 
The empire survived but lost the most recently 
conquered territories on the northern fron-
tier. At the end of the fourth century large 
numbers of Goths crossed the Danube, and 
they were followed in the next two genera-
tions by more tribes, some coming across 
the Rhine. Control over first Britain and then 
northern Gaul was lost during the fifth cen-
tury, and Spain and Africa followed. By the 
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4 Rome and Imperialism
sixth century all territories west of the Adriatic 
were controlled by Germanic kingdoms, 
some making use of Roman institutions 
and bureaucrats. An attempt by the eastern 
emperor, now based in Constantinople, to 
reconquer parts of the west later in the cen-
tury met with limited success. Meanwhile 
Roman frontiers in the east were under inter-
mittent pressure from the Persians. Around 
the middle of the sixth century, while eastern 
Roman armies were campaigning in Italy, 
the Persians sacked Antioch in Syria. Fresh 
invasions of Italy and the Balkans from the 
north followed, and in the early seventh cen-
tury Rome lost Jerusalem and Egypt to Persia. 
The Persians did not enjoy their control of 
the Near East for long. In 636 Arab armies 
defeated the Romans at the battle of Yarmuk, 
but by 651 they had destroyed the Persian 
Empire and by 711 they had conquered all of 
north Africa and invaded Visigothic Spain. 
Byzantium survived as a micro-empire sur-
rounding the Aegean Sea.
The key stages of Roman expansion may be 
summarised as follows:
1. c.500–275 BCE: Slow incremental exten-
sion of power within Italian peninsula.
2. 275–73 BCE: Progressive elimina-
tion of rival hegemonies within the 
Mediterranean basin.
3. 73 BCE–9 CE: Period of accelerating 
expansion including conquest of half of 
temperate Europe, Egypt, and most of the 
Near East.
4. 9–132 CE: Period of general consolidation 
with limited conquests and the absorption 
of client states into provinces.
5. 132–378 CE: Period of pressure largely 
survived with only some territorial losses.
6. 378–717 CE: Period of accelerating 
contraction.
The first part of this pattern closely resembles 
a trajectory followed by some other empires. 
The rise of Qin during the Warring States 
period was slow until the last generation, 
when it accelerated rapidly and then stopped 
in a moment of institutional consolidation 
that laid the foundations for Han China. The 
creation of the Achaemenid Empire too began 
with a slow rise to power of the Medes and 
Persians followed by the rapid conquest of 
Assyrian, Babylonian, Egyptian, and Lydian 
kingdoms and a period of institutionalisation 
under Darius. The Inka created their empire 
in less than a century, again by absorbing a 
series of well-established polities and con-
necting them up with a new infrastructure. 
Historical sociologists sometimes describe 
this as a shift from ‘conquest state’ to ‘tribu-
tary empire’: that is, a set of institutions 
based on and supporting expansion came 
to be replaced – often after a crisis – with a 
new set of institutions invested in sustain-
able dominion. The current scholarly focus 
is on the expansion-bearing structures of the 
Republican period, and for the Principate 
on the means by which consent was secured 
from the empire’s subjects. These emphases 
have largely replaced approaches that sought 
to understand the reasons for Roman expan-
sion in the Republic and for Roman ‘stagna-
tion’ under the emperors, in terms of the 
motivations of leading political actors, and/or 
else in terms of institutional or cultural excep-
tionalism. Those earlier approaches reflected 
ancient understandings of the rise of Rome.
Ancient understandings
Ancient explanations of the rise of Rome 
tended to invoke the virtue and piety of the 
Romans, the excellence of their civic insti-
tutions, and the favour of the gods (Ferrary 
1988; North 1993). So Ennius, the great epic 
poet of the second century BCE, wrote in 
Annals (a fragment cited in Cicero, Republic 
5.1), ‘Moribus antiquis res stat Romana 
virisque’ (‘The Roman state depends on 
ancient customs and on its men’ – or ‘… 
on its manhood’, since virtue and manli-
ness are denoted by the same word in Latin). 
This tended to be understood in terms of the 
cumulative virtue of individual Romans, espe-
cially of members of the propertied classes 
who supplied civil magistrates, priests, and 
generals. The first emperor, Augustus, repre-
sented this tradition when he filled the forum 
built around the temple of Mars Ultor (Mars 
the Avenger) with more than 100 images of 
summi viri, great Romans of the past who had 
extended the power (imperium) of the Roman 
people. Each statue was accompanied by a 
label that listed the individual’s magistra-
cies and priesthoods and the victories he had 
achieved. Alongside these were statues of the 
founders of Rome, Romulus and Aeneas, of 
the divine ancestors of the Romans and of 
Augustus’ family, and of Augustus himself 
(Geiger 2008). A separate monument in the 
forum Romanum bore lists (fasti) that named 
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 Rome and Imperialism 5
all the Romans who had held the supreme 
magistracy – the consulship – and separately 
all those who had ever celebrated a triumph. 
Public monuments of this kind picked up a 
much older tradition. The family tomb of the 
Scipiones on the via Appia includes a series 
of sarcophagi with labels that for each promi-
nent member of the family list their great-
est (generally military) achievements. The 
announcements that Augustus made at the 
inauguration of his forum and the temple of 
Mars Ultor proclaimed that the deeds of the 
greatest Romans of the past would be a model 
for him and his successors to follow: young 
male members of the aristocracy underwent 
many of their rites of passage against the 
backdrop of these monuments. 
The relationship between the Romans and 
their gods was thought of more collectively. 
Prodigies and omens were reported to the 
senate; colleges of senatorial priests were 
charged with devising and carrying out ritu-
als to ensure the gods remained supportive; 
wars had to be declared according to particu-
lar rituals; generals consulted the heavens 
before going to war, made battlefield vows 
for success, and on their return set up tem-
ples to the gods concerned to acknowledge 
their help. The ever-evolving ceremony of the 
triumph brought the entire city together in a 
collective restoration of the peaceful order 
and a display of honour shared by the aristo-
cratic general, the citizen army, and the gods 
themselves (Beard 2007; Östenberg 2009). 
Yet even in these collective ceremonies, indi-
viduals asserted themselves. Successful gen-
erals added the names of defeated peoples or 
places to their own, both in ordinary usage 
and on monuments (so Fabius Maximus 
Allobrogicus after the Allobroges he defeated 
in the middle Rhône valley, and Publius 
Cornelius Scipio Africanus for his victories 
in the Punic Wars). The streets of Republican 
Rome came to be lined with victory temples, 
often fulfilling vows made on the battlefield 
by generals who paid for them from their 
share of the booty, and were eventually deco-
rated with art works that commemorated 
the triumphs of the Roman people (Holliday 
2002). Temples of this kind were often main-
tained by the aristocratic descendants of the 
dedicator, and at noble funerals distinguished 
ancestors were animated by actors who wore 
effigies of the dead and robes appropriate to 
their status, while the military exploits of the 
deceased were rehearsed in speeches. 
More generally, warfare was a central loca-
tion for building fame. Wars lay at the centre 
of the epic poetry of Ennius and his predeces-
sors, and then of Latin historiography. When 
Ennius’s patron Fulvius Nobilior returned 
in triumph from campaigns in the Balkans, 
he created a great temple and precinct where 
plundered statuary was displayed, and spon-
sored a play about his victories. Individual 
achievements and the interests of the Roman 
people were repeatedly elided. Conversely 
when things went wrong it was often the 
result of inadequate ritual preparation on 
the part of the generals, or occasionally of 
other members of the senatorial order: a 
Vestal Virgin who broke her vow of chas-
tity was sometime identified and punished 
with death. During the civil wars of the late 
Republic some orators and historians began 
to blame military and civil disasters on a gen-
eral falling away of moral standards, the cor-
rupting effects of luxury, contamination by 
alien values, and the like (Lintott 1972).
Institutional explanations for the rise of 
Rome were produced in parallel to these 
internal moralising debates. The Greek his-
torian Polybius, who spent much of his adult 
life in Rome as an honoured hostage, attrib-
uted Roman success to what we would term 
the comparative advantage of its institutions. 
The Roman political system was a judicious 
blend of monarchical, aristocratic, and dem-
ocratic elements, and its military and reli-
gious institutions were superior to those of 
its rivals. The concepts Polybius employed 
were derived ultimately from the political phi-
losophy of Aristotle and Plato, but they were 
not felt to be in conflict with native Roman 
ideas about the importance of virtue. Greek 
thinkers did not see political institutions in 
the way Hobbes did as a remedy for the bru-
talities of the state of nature, but rather as 
means of establishing ways of life in which 
humans naturally reached their full poten-
tial. Although often ascribed to Aristotle, this 
idea was traditional: Xenophon had ascribed 
Spartan success to the perfection of its insti-
tutions and the habits they inculcated, and 
so it was natural for Polybius to move from 
the Roman constitution to Roman conduct. 
At least some of his Roman contemporar-
ies would have agreed, even if others might 
have stressed the particular favour the gods 
showed to peoples of particular piety. Roman 
leaders were, on the whole, careful to estab-
lish that their wars were justified, both to 
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6 Rome and Imperialism
ensure divine favour and to win the support 
of the popular assemblies that voted on war 
and peace. But these justifications, achieved 
by rhetoric and ritual, were focused on indi-
vidual conflicts. Only in the last generation 
of the Republic did the notion emerge that 
Romans had a general mandate to conquer 
the world and rule it well (Brunt 1978; Ferrary 
1988).
Ancient writers spent much less time try-
ing to explain why Romans fought so many 
wars. One reason is that most ancient states 
were both warlike and engaged in sporadic 
disputes with their neighbours. City states 
generally fielded citizen armies, and military 
training was often a key part of the process by 
which young men became full citizens. Tribal 
communities seem also to have embraced 
a warrior ethos, to judge from grave goods 
and art works like Situla-Art of the Alps or 
the Gundestrup cauldron from Denmark. 
The question was not so much why cities 
and peoples came to blows, but rather why 
some did so more successfully than others. 
Thucydides had dramatised a debate on this 
theme between the Athenians and the Melians 
in the second book of his Peloponnesian War: 
the Athenians refuse to spare the Melians, 
on the ground that the strong always do 
what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must. A Roman legend told how when the 
Gauls were extracting indemnities from the 
Romans they were caught using false meas-
ures to weigh out gold. When challenged a 
Gallic chief pressed down the scale with his 
sword exclaiming, ‘Vae victis!’ (‘Woe to the 
vanquished!; Livy, History of Rome 5.48.9). War 
was a normal state of affairs, and what was 
special about the Romans was not that they 
fought wars, but that they were so successful 
at doing so.
Explaining expansion
The modern debate over the origins of 
Republican imperialism has taken a more 
tortuous route than that followed by ancient 
explanations. On the basis of the Roman 
notion that only just wars received divine sup-
port and on Roman accounts of the origins 
of several conflicts, it was for a while argued 
that Rome expanded accidentally, along the 
lines of Sir John Robert Seeley’s quip that 
the British ‘conquered and peopled half 
the world in a fit of absence of mind’ (1914: 
10). Romans, according to some, practised 
‘defensive imperialism’, responding only 
to external threats and finding themselves 
rather surprisingly in command of the world 
as a result. Support for this view was found in 
the supposed slowness of Romans to convert 
victories in the east into territorial provinces 
or to assume the imperial responsibilities to 
which their military success seemed to entitle 
them.
That view was comprehensively demol-
ished by the demonstration that Romans con-
sistently displayed attitudes that supported 
warfare, celebrated victory, and rewarded 
successful generals (Harris 1979, 1984). 
Among the institutions that cohered well 
with expansion were the practice of requiring 
defeated peoples to supply troops for further 
campaigns (Gabba 1976); the ritual of the 
triumph that marked the end of a success-
ful war (Beard 2007); and a series of devices 
for expanding the citizen body, and so the 
citizen army (Raaflaub 1996). Warfare was 
not an absolute constant: there were periods 
of greater and less mobilisation. If Roman 
warfare was not primarily defensive there 
were certainly some wars that Rome did not 
choose, as when the King of Pontus invaded 
Rome’s eastern provinces in the early last cen-
tury BCE or when migrations penetrated the 
Mediterranean world from temperate Europe 
(Rich 1993). But in general it is fair to charac-
terise the Roman Republic as a society geared 
for war, and in some respects dependent on 
warfare to satisfy the demands of its aristoc-
racy and people for glory and booty. 
That gearing naturally encompassed eco-
nomic activity of various kinds. Rome had 
no independent mercantile class that might 
lobby for annexation. Indeed annexation 
reduced some opportunities for profiteer-
ing, as in the case of the slave trade (enslave-
ment was in principle illegal within the 
empire), and because provincials had from 
the middle of the second century BCE some 
recourse to Roman justice that those outside 
the empire did not. There were no ancient 
equivalents of the chartered joint-stock com-
panies that played such prominent parts in 
British, Dutch, and other European imperial-
isms from the 17th century on. Corporations 
had very little place in Roman law, the clos-
est equivalent being short-lived societates 
–  partnerships – which tendered for public 
contracts. The economic basis of pre-capital-
ist and capitalist imperialism was naturally 
very different.
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All the same most sectors of Roman society 
benefited from expansion, directly or indi-
rectly. Successful generals brought back great 
amounts of booty, and their personal share 
of it was not limited to what was spent on 
the gods or on triumphal feasts and games. 
Citizen soldiers and allies alike also received 
shares of the booty. The proceeds of con-
quest were spread more widely. The defeat 
of Macedon in 168 BCE was followed by the 
abandonment of direct taxation of Roman 
citizens in Italy. The sacks of Carthage and 
Corinth in 146 BCE were followed by a great 
aqueduct-building project, and monuments 
were set up in Italian allied cities as well as 
in Rome. Public building did not only ben-
efit citizens by creating a more splendid built 
environment and sponsoring festivals within 
it. Army supply, the extraction of revenue, and 
its expenditure in building projects all came 
to rely on public contracts, generally issued 
by the censors in Rome. These contracts 
included the construction of public basilicas, 
paved forums, and roads, in Roman colo-
nies as well as in the city itself. Only citizens 
could take public contracts, and in principle 
senators were forbidden to be principals. But 
great amounts of property were needed to 
guarantee larger contracts, and it is clear that 
behind the main contractors (publicani), who 
were often members of Rome’s junior aristoc-
racy, the equestrian order, there were senato-
rial backers. Polybius claimed in his Histories 
(6.17) that as early as the first half of the 
second century BCE ‘everyone’ in Rome was 
involved. For a brief period in the last century 
BCE, when some contracts were very large, 
especially that for gathering the taxes of Asia, 
these bids and their five-yearly renewals did 
have political ramifications. But in general the 
propertied classes all benefited from empire. 
Provincial populations bore the brunt. 
During the last century BCE in particular 
Roman power was exercised at the expense 
of provincial populations in many ways. 
Through plunder and purchase, the wealthy 
extracted cultural products from the Greek 
world – books and educated slaves as well 
as bronze and marble statuary and crafts-
men. Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul removed so 
much bullion from the region that silver and 
gold coinages were effectively extinguished 
north of the Alps. Large sums of money were 
occasionally lent to provincials at extortion-
ate rates of interest, in the knowledge that 
the governors would allow the creditors to use 
Roman soldiers to recover what they were 
owed if borrowers defaulted. All this paid for 
grand villas and town houses, and also the 
bribery of electors and jurors. Verres, prose-
cuted by Cicero for corruption while governor 
of Sicily, was quoted as saying that he needed 
to extract three fortunes from his province, 
one to repay those who had elected him, 
another to bribe those who would try him on 
his return, and a third for himself (Cicero, 
Against Verres 1.1.40). Cicero’s speeches allude 
to many other corruption trials, and a series 
of laws were passed from 149 BCE onwards 
aimed at recovering money embezzled by 
governors. Stories of violence and torture 
also circulated, and the cruelty and greed 
of Roman officials and tax-farmers form 
a regular part of the explanations offered 
in this period for revolts and anti-Roman 
movements. At the beginning of his Annales, 
Tacitus wrote that the provinces were unper-
turbed by the fall of the Republic because they 
had suffered so much from the feuding gen-
erals and corrupt officials and had no faith in 
legal redress in Rome (Levick 1994). 
One other group which seems to have lost 
out in the process was the free peasantry 
of Italy, some at least of whom found their 
small holdings swallowed up by large estates, 
worked in part by slaves. The absence of 
peasants on long campaigns and the enrich-
ment of the generals that led them have been 
seen to be contributory factors, but the scale 
and timing of these changes are disputed 
(Hopkins 1978; Rosenstein 2004). Slaves 
never completely replaced free peasants, who 
still played a part in the agricultural regimes 
of Italy during the principate, and few sub-
scribe to the thesis that imperial expansion 
was driven by the demands of a ‘Slave Mode 
of Production’ (Rathbone 1983).
It is unsurprising, of course, that Rome in 
its expansionist phases had the institutions 
and ideologies that cohered with expansion 
(North 1981). But it is less obvious that those 
institutions and ideologies actually explain 
expansion as Polybius argued. A full expla-
nation in terms of comparative advantage 
would have to look at Rome’s rivals – Veii, 
Carthage, Macedon, and so on – and assess 
differences in institutions and how they fitted 
with differences in success or policy objec-
tives. Multi-state analysis of this kind, mak-
ing use of political theory, has only just begun 
(Eckstein 2006, 2007). Besides, Roman insti-
tutions and ideas were in constant flux. Most 
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8 Rome and Imperialism
importantly, innovations often seem to have 
been reactions to expansion, not preparations 
for it. Broadening access to citizenship came 
in practice as response to a series of crises in 
Rome’s relations with her allies. The balance 
of power between magistrates and civil insti-
tutions that Polybius praised had in fact to 
shift over time as generals served further and 
further away from Rome and for longer peri-
ods. Perhaps the best illustration is provided 
by recent studies of the language of Roman 
imperialism (Richardson 2008). Romans 
developed territorial senses of provincia and 
imperium only in the last century BCE, long 
after they had de facto acquired first foreign 
possessions and then an identifiable sphere 
under permanent control. The same time 
lag is evident in the development of provin-
cial taxation, in the elaboration of the role of 
governor from simply a military commander 
to a judicial official and plenipotentiary rep-
resentative of Rome in the provinces, and in 
the gradual shift from annual citizen levies to 
what were in effect professional armies that 
might serve for years on end and needed 
to be re-integrated into society when they 
were disbanded. In each case these changes 
responded to expansion rather than being 
designed to facilitate it. 
The period of fastest expansion was partly 
driven by the failure of annual campaigns 
around the Mediterranean basin to stabilise 
Roman hegemony. The victories of the sec-
ond century were followed by the return and 
disbanding of Roman armies. No garrisons 
and no administrations were left behind. 
A system of military commands that ema-
nated from a competitive political system 
meant that even when there were a num-
ber of armies and generals in the field at the 
same time there was no guarantee that they 
would co-operate. Rome depended for infor-
mation on embassies sent by her allies, who 
were often rivals. Much of the history of the 
second century BCE seems to have been 
driven by competition in the periphery, and 
when that became engaged with factional-
ism in the centre the effects could be very 
disruptive. Finally, there were some intrinsic 
difficulties facing any power that wished to 
control the Mediterranean world. One was a 
high incidence of piracy and banditry, which 
thrived in periods of political fragmentation: 
Hellenistic kingdoms had struggled to main-
tain some order and their defeat by Rome 
made the situation worse. A second problem 
was ecological in origin: strong economic 
and demographic ties existed between the 
societies of the Mediterranean littoral and 
those of its mountainous hinterlands. This 
meant that it was in practice impossible to 
control what is now Aegean Turkey without 
exercising influence over the Anatolian pla-
teau; that Provence and could be governed if 
only the populations of the middle and upper 
Rhône were subjects or allies; and so on. 
From the late second century BCE onwards 
Roman armies were repeatedly drawn into 
the hinterlands of the Mediterranean World, 
and this required larger armies and greater 
co-ordination. Once these were supplied the 
results were at first impressive. During the 
last century BCE a series of generals, begin-
ning with Marius and Sulla, showed what one 
general could achieve given very large forces 
for a substantial period of time and more or 
less freedom of action to make war and peace 
on whom he saw fit. ‘Peripheral imperial-
ism’ enabled Pompey to conquer and settle 
much of Anatolia, the southern Black Sea 
coast, and the Near East, and allowed Caesar 
to make similar conquests in the north-west 
(Richardson 1986). Yet neither these large 
armies nor their generals could easily be 
contained with the institutions of the city of 
Rome. The logic of these developments was 
the shift from Republic to monarchy. One of 
the first acts of the first emperor was to create 
a professional army bound to himself and his 
family, and paid for from hypothecated tax 
income and a military treasury. In that sense 
the Roman Empire was a product of Roman 
imperialism.
None of this helps to explain, however, 
Rome’s initial success. If it did not depend 
on extraordinary institutions or the virtue of 
generations of Roman aristocrats how are 
we to explain it? One answer is to set it in the 
context of wider histories of political growth 
in the Mediterranean world (Garnsey and 
Whittaker 1978). The size of political systems 
was increasing and their number decreasing 
over the last millennium BCE, presumably as 
a result of competition within an open sys-
tem, economic growth and some advances in 
communications. The question then becomes 
why was Rome one of the eventual winners? 
Geopolitics might help. Rome benefited from 
a central position first within Italy, and later 
within the Mediterranean basin. Perhaps too 
Rome’s position on the margin of politically 
plural systems helped: it was on the edge of 
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 Rome and Imperialism 9
the Etruscan city state civilisation, and later 
on the edge of the Hellenistic kingdoms, 
and that position (also enjoyed by Qin in the 
Warring States period, or Macedon in the 
fourth century BCE) seems to sometimes con-
fer an advantage. Complexes of peer-polities 
often advance together, but sometimes tend 
to limit the rise of any one polity, through 
alliances of the others (Ma 2003; Renfrew 
and Cherry 1986). Change, or contingency, 
played a part too. Roman schoolchildren liked 
to debate what would have happened had 
Hannibal marched on Rome after Cannae, 
and Greek writers occasionally wondered 
what would have happened had Alexander 
marched west. We might also wonder how 
close Rome came to defeat in the Mithradatic 
Wars, or much later in the third-century 
crisis.
The tributary empire
If a conquest state is a polity dependent on 
constant expansion, a tributary empire is 
similarly invested in more sustainable and 
stable institutions (Bang and Bayly 2011; 
Crone 1989). Its political economy is based on 
regular exactions which are largely redistrib-
uted to the military, to officials, and to those 
who occupy privileged positions in the hierar-
chy of power. The rulers of tributary empires 
typically seek to reduce their transaction costs – 
imposing the running costs of empire on 
local elites, tax farmers, and the like – and 
they have few ambitions beyond retaining 
and passing on their power. Empires of this 
kind have been among the most stable politi-
cal in world history, often enduring for cen-
turies (Arnason and Raaflaub 2011). Typically 
they are characterised by universalising ideol-
ogies, and their rulers actively suppress signs 
of change and information about opposi-
tion (Bang and Kolodziejczyz 2012; Yuge and 
Doi 1988).
Rome extracted no revenue from its mili-
tary supremacy until after it dominated the 
whole of the Italian peninsula. Campaigns 
paid for themselves, and the defeated contrib-
uted levies to future campaigns. Hellenistic 
kingdoms, by contrast, most of which were 
in effect successor states to the Achaemenid 
Persian Empire, had complex taxation sys-
tems. Once Rome began to extend its power 
overseas it encountered and incorporated 
some of these systems, and also began to 
need (or desire) greater revenues. One of the 
first fiscal systems taken over by Rome was 
a tithe levied on the cities of the kingdom 
of Syracuse by the third-century king Hiero 
II. After the second Punic war this system 
(the Lex Hieronica) was extended to the whole 
island province, and its revenues redirected to 
Rome. The same war brought Rome control 
of much of Mediterranean Spain, including 
silver mines near Cartagena. That conquest, 
and a need to provision Roman armies based 
for long periods in Spain, led in the second 
century to a regular levy on subject communi-
ties, the first provincial tax system devised by 
Rome (Richardson 1976). When the kingdom 
of Pergamum was acquired in 133 BCE the 
royal tax system was incorporated in the same 
way as the Syracusan one had been (Cottier et 
al. 2008). The administration of Roman Egypt 
owed much to Ptolemaic precedents, which in 
turn drew on a deep sedimentation of Persian 
and Pharaonic systems. Probably there were 
other examples of this that are simply less 
well documented.
The transition from conquest state to tribu-
tary empire was not a sudden one. Roman 
armies of conquest never stopped extracting 
booty from conquered peoples. The Romans’ 
initial response to the defeats of Carthage 
and Macedon was to impose indemnities 
to be paid in annual instalments over long 
but not indefinite periods. Only when those 
states were abolished was more regular taxa-
tion substituted. The tributary empire grew 
up within the body of a conquest state. The 
crucial period of change was the reign of 
Augustus, the first emperor, when provincial 
censuses were conducted across the empire 
with the aim of fixing permanent tax obliga-
tions. Ordering the empire was by no means 
a dry, bureaucratic process but was intimately 
linked to the creation of new universalis-
ing ideology of power, expressed in poetry 
and public monuments (Galinsky 1996; Gros 
1976; Nicolet 1988; Zanker 1987). By the time 
of Augustus’s death in 14 CE most of the 
empire was subject to taxation, only Italy and 
a few privileged cities enjoying exemptions 
from the land tax. Local civic elites collected 
most of the land tax, overseen by imperial ex-
slaves and junior aristocrats named procura-
tors, who also managed the emperors’ own 
extensive provincial possessions and helped 
supply the army. Soldiers assisted the procu-
rators where necessary, for example in escort-
ing tax grain or bullion. There were also 
indirect taxes, for example on freeing slaves 
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10 Rome and Imperialism
and on sales, many of them still managed by 
tax farmers (Brunt 1990). There were internal 
tariffs on trade between groups of provinces 
(France 2001). Over time tax-farmers seem 
to have been replaced by officials but it was 
a slow and patchy process, more a sign of a 
shift in imperial attitudes to government than 
of any global reorganisation. Bizarrely as it 
seems to us – but quite normally for a patri-
monial empire – the whole was co-ordinated 
not by some central agency, but within the 
emperor’s own household (Suetonius, Divus 
Augustus 101).
If the main lines of a tributary empire had 
emerged during the penultimate decade 
of the last millennium BCE with the first 
great provincial censuses, Rome continued 
to behave in some ways as a conquest state 
for some time longer. Augustus himself fol-
lowed up this reorganisation with a long 
series of campaigns in temperate Europe that 
consolidated Roman control of Caesar’s con-
quests and the Balkans and advanced armies 
up to and temporarily beyond the Rhine and 
the Danube. A series of defeats, culminating 
in a major disaster in 9 CE, slowed expansion. 
But there were further wars in Germany under 
his successor Tiberius and on the English 
Channel under Gaius, and under Claudius 
Britain was invaded. Later in the first cen-
tury CE there were campaigns in south-west 
Germany as well as in Britain, before Trajan’s 
spectacular wars in metal-rich Dacia in the 
early second century on the basis of which he 
created the greatest of the imperial forums in 
Rome, equipped with libraries, monumental 
statues, and the column that bears his name. 
One reason for these occasional expeditions – 
often undertaken by emperors who needed 
to demonstrate their ability – was that even 
if Rome’s political economy was no longer 
geared to war, Roman public ideology could 
not dispense with the connection between 
virtue and warfare. All emperors were repre-
sented on statues, on coinage, and on monu-
ments in military dress, all tried to maintain 
a close relation with the troops, and serious 
instability occurred only (in the third cen-
tury) when emperors seemed no longer able 
to be effective war leaders. Another reason 
was that in many areas there was no obvious 
natural frontier: several expeditions in Britain 
and Germany do seem to have been designed 
to find limits that might be more cheaply and 
efficiently controlled. Yet the fact that the 
empire barely expanded beyond its Augustan 
limits indicates that on some level emperors 
understood that they had more to lose than 
gain by reckless and expensive campaigning. 
Tiberius understood the bottom line when he 
told one governor that he wanted his sheep 
shorn, not flayed. 
Much remains unclear about early imperial 
tax systems. Taxes might be levied in cash or 
kind, and although kind presumably mostly 
meant agricultural produce examples are 
known of levies of other materials such as 
hides. But it is difficult to estimate the scale of 
monetised taxation. There was certainly wide 
variation in taxes and in mechanisms for their 
extraction: wherever we can see local arrange-
ments in detail they are peculiar to that prov-
ince or region. Everywhere the burden fell 
disproportionately on the poor and on those 
who were not Roman citizens. Evidently the 
emperors had no interest in creating empire-
wide systems, standards, or even tax rates. To 
the end of the third century CE, the tax system 
was really an agglomeration of local systems 
designed in different periods according to dif-
ferent principles, subsequently emended and 
supplemented, and run in a range of tradi-
tional ways (Brunt 1981). A number of inscrip-
tions which stated exactly which taxes were 
current show that the system confused con-
temporaries as much as it does us.
If the emperors were not interested in 
rationalising systems there were nevertheless 
some consistencies in the kind of order they 
created through this mixture of violence and 
institutional bricolage. Most obviously they 
enlisted the help in all parts of their empire 
of the local ruling classes (Brunt 1976). Tribal 
chiefs in Gaul and Palestine, the priests of 
Egyptian temples, the wealthier members of 
Greek cities, kings in the Alps, the Atlas, and 
Anatolia, all were brought into a great coali-
tion of interest, and tied through marriage, 
ceremony, and honours to the rulers of Rome. 
The pattern is familiar from other imperial 
systems (Cannadine 2001; Galtung 1971). 
This was a key difference from the Republican 
empire, which first in Italy and then around 
the Mediterranean had failed to include local 
rulers among the beneficiaries of empire. 
Control and its limits
The Roman Empire at its peak contained 
around 60 million people, perhaps 20 per 
cent of the global population. Its army never 
exceeded 500,000 men and was usually much 
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smaller. It is evident that control could not 
depend on coercion alone.
It is widely agreed that a fundamental fac-
tor stabilising the empire was the fact that 
it served the propertied classes of the socie-
ties within it. Not only were they partners in 
extracting revenue. Many enjoyed the status 
of citizens, and by the second century the ‘bet-
ter sort of people’ (termed honestiores) enjoyed 
privileged legal status too, being treated bet-
ter than others in investigations and, if found 
guilty, in terms of penalty (Garnsey 1970). 
Many found it easy to participate in the gov-
ernance of the empire, becoming auxiliary 
commanders, members of the equestrian 
order, and even members of the senate. A few 
enjoyed the friendship and patronage of prom-
inent Romans and even the emperor (Saller 
1982). Interest was converted, at least among 
some of them, into a sense of membership and 
adherence to the imperial order. When dynas-
ties collapsed new ones were put into place by 
alliances of courtiers, senators, and soldiers, 
all of whom had vested interests in the status 
quo. Beyond the wealthy it is difficult to gauge 
allegiances or opinion. Ceremony, ideology, 
monumentality, and governmentality together 
formed willing subjects in many places (Ando 
2000). We know most about urban popula-
tions, especially those of Italy, but in those 
locations at least there are no real signs of 
disaffection. Urban populations, and not just 
their rulers, participated with enthusiasm in 
ruler cults of all sorts (Cancik and Hitzl 2003; 
Price 1984; Small 1996). More generally it is 
evident that a set of empire-wide cultural prac-
tices, styles, and habits became routine (Woolf 
1998). How often participation in this was 
experienced consciously as political adherence 
is very difficult to say. 
The alternative is to concentrate on epi-
sodes of unrest (Bowersock 1987; Momigliano 
1987; Shaw 2000; Woolf 2011). Relatively few 
are well documented, and although this prob-
ably partly reflects deliberate under-reporting, 
those that are mentioned occurred in broadly 
similar circumstances. A number of conflicts 
took place in the generation immediately after 
conquest, and seem to have been fuelled in 
part by the social convulsions and transfor-
mations that affected many societies (Dyson 
1971, 1975). Areas close to the edge of the 
empire – whether the northern frontier or the 
Romano-Parthian borderlands – were more 
likely to experience revolts than other regions. 
Revolts were more common in time of Roman 
civil war. Mountainous areas were more diffi-
cult to control than plains or coasts. None of 
this is surprising. Attempts to link these out-
breaks of opposition to cultural differences 
(e.g. Bénabou 1976) have not convinced many. 
A number of local disturbances seem to have 
had mainly local roots (Goodman 1987): per-
haps this would be true of most if we had bet-
ter information. Few were serious: the main 
threats to the authority of emperors came 
either from their intimate circle (from which 
assassinations emerged) or from armies led by 
their rivals. There were surprisingly few mili-
tary revolts of that kind before the early third 
century CE (Shaw 1983; Woolf 1993). In all 
these respects Roman imperialism seems very 
like that of other early empires.
Greg Woolf
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